Why do financial systems differ? History matters. by Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin





Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
December 8, 2004
Abstract
We describe a dynamic model of ﬁnancial intermediation in which fundamental char-
acteristics of the economy imply a unique equilibrium path of bank and ﬁnancial market
lending. Yet we also show that economies whose fundamental characteristics have con-
verged may continue to have very diﬀerent ﬁnancial structures. Because setting up
ﬁnancial markets is costly in our model, economies that emphasize ﬁnancial market
lending are more likely to continue doing so in the future, all else equal.
Keywords: Financial Systems, Financial Markets, Financial Institutions, Banks, Convergence.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L16, G10, G20, N20.
∗This project was undertaken when Erwan Quintin was a research visitor at the European Central Bank,
which he wishes to thank for its hospitality. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily the one
of the European Central Bank, the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve
System. cyril.monnet@ecb.int and erwan.quintin@dal.frb.org
1Why do Financial Systems Diﬀer? History Matters.
Abstract
We describe a dynamic model of ﬁnancial intermediation in which fundamental character-
istics of the economy imply a unique equilibrium path of bank and ﬁnancial market lending.
Yet we also show that economies whose fundamental characteristics have converged may con-
tinue to have very diﬀerent ﬁnancial structures. Because setting up ﬁnancial markets is costly
in our model, economies that emphasize ﬁnancial market lending are more likely to continue
doing so in the future, all else equal.
21 Introduction
Financial systems vary greatly even among nations at similar stages of economic develop-
ment.1 For instance, bank lending is the leading source of funds for most German ﬁrms,
while ﬁnancial markets play a larger role in the U.S. (see ﬁgure 1 in the appendix). In
this paper, we describe a model in which two economies can continue to have very diﬀerent
ﬁnancial systems long after their fundamental characteristics have converged.
Speciﬁcally, we embed the adverse selection model of Bolton and Freixas (2000) in a
dynamic, general equilibrium framework. Bolton and Freixas describe a simple static model
in which banks and direct intermediation co-exist. One could rely on other models in which
diﬀerent borrowers choose diﬀerent ﬁnancial options. The dynamic results we establish in
this paper do not depend on the static theory of ﬁnancial intermediation one has in mind.
We consider an environment where time is discrete and, every period, a continuum of
borrowers need to fund a two-stage, risky project. The likelihood of a positive payoﬀ at the
end of the ﬁrst stage is public information, but only the borrower knows the likelihood of a
positive payoﬀ at the end of the second stage of his project. Other agents simply know that
projects more likely to succeed in the ﬁrst stage are also more likely to succeed in the second
stage. Lenders can make their funds available to borrowers directly on a ﬁnancial market,
or, instead, via a bank. Bank intermediation is costly, but the bank learns the quality of the
project at the end of the ﬁrst stage. In the ﬁnancial market, lenders discover the quality of
the project after funding its second stage. Entry into the ﬁnancial market carries an initial
ﬁxed cost, but no further cost until lenders choose to exit and revert to using the bank.
In competitive equilibrium, agents take the gross surplus lenders can expect on the ﬁ-
nancial market as given, and the market for each type of ﬁnancing clears every period. As
in Bolton and Freixas, borrowers whose project is too risky receive no funding, while safe
projects are funded on the ﬁnancial market. Projects of intermediate risk level obtain fund-
1Allen and Gale (2000) provide a comprehensive survey of ﬁnancial structures in several developed coun-
tries.
3ing from the bank. One key result we establish is that given a sequence of fundamental
characteristics (that is, for each period, the cost of bank intermediation, the cost of entry
on the ﬁnancial market, and the distribution of project characteristics) and given an initial
size of the ﬁnancial market, a unique equilibrium sequence of ﬁnancial market sizes exists.
Put another way, fundamentals fully explain ﬁnancial systems. Yet we also establish that
convergence in fundamentals does not imply ﬁnancial convergence. Economies with diﬀer-
ent initial ﬁnancial systems may continue to diﬀer even if their fundamental characteristics
become forever identical. The intuition for this result is simple. Current fundamentals may
not justify entry into the ﬁnancial market for lenders who have yet to pay the ﬁxed cost,
but it may be proﬁtable for incumbent lenders to stay put. The ﬁnancial market can remain
persistently large in an economy where past fundamentals led a high number of lenders to
bear the entry cost. It follows that to understand an economy’s current ﬁnancial structure,
one needs to take account of past fundamentals. In other words, history matters.
In the appendix, we brieﬂy document the well-known fact that institutional environments
used to diﬀer greatly between Germany and the U.S. Our theory suggests that despite the
fact that these diﬀerences have been fading, the U.S. and German ﬁnancial systems could
continue diﬀering for a long time. That the U.S. developed large ﬁnancial markets early is
not surprising given its institutional history. According to our model, this head-start could
explain why the U.S. continues to emphasize ﬁnancial markets today. Similarly, the fact that
banks have played a large role historically in Germany could explain why they are still a
prominent form of ﬁnance today.
By rationalizing diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures even in observably similar economies,
our theory diﬀers from those of Dewratipont and Maskin (1995), Holmstrom (1996), or Bolton
and Freixas (2000), among others. In eﬀect, we show that embedding those theories in a stan-
dard framework of ﬁrm dynamics can help us understand the persistence of ﬁnancial struc-
tures. Furthermore, we obtain persistence without resorting to multiple equilibria. Baliga and
Pollak (2004), for instance, ﬁnd that their static model of monitored versus non-monitored
ﬁnancing can support both German and Anglo-saxon equilibria that are robust to individual
4deviations. In our model, the equilibrium is unique and Pareto eﬃcient. As in Allen and Gale
(2000), ﬁnancial outcomes cannot be Pareto ranked. More generally, ours is a step towards
thinking about ﬁnancial systems in the context of a dynamic, general equilibrium environment
in which the impact of policy choices can be studied.
2 The environment
Time is discrete and inﬁnite. The economy we study is populated by three classes of risk-
neutral agents: borrowers, lenders, and a bank. Lenders have mass  >1. They are inﬁnitely
lived, discount future ﬂows at rate β ∈ (0,1), and are endowed with two units of the consump-
tion good at the beginning of each period. A mass one of borrowers are born every period.
They live for one period2 and are not endowed with any consumption good. They are how-
ever endowed with a productive technology described by parameters p1 ∈ (0, ¯ p], p2 ∈{ 0,1}
and R>0. This technology transforms one unit of the consumption good invested at the
beginning of the period into R units after half a period with probability p1. With probability
1 − p1, this ﬁrst investment yields nothing. Borrowers can then invest another unit of the
consumption good with proceeds R with probability p2, 0 with probability 1−p2. Borrowers
also enjoy non-monetary beneﬁts B for each half-period in which their project is implemented.
While R is common across borrowers, p1 and p2 vary. Borrowers know all the charac-
teristics of their own technology, but other agents only know p1 and R. We will refer to
borrowers with p2 = 1 as good borrowers, and to other borrowers as bad borrowers. While
lenders do not know p1, they know that p1 and p2 are correlated in the following speciﬁc sense:
E[p2|p1]=g(p1)w h e r eg is a strictly increasing, continuous function such that g(0) = 0 and
g(¯ p) < 1. That is, lenders know that fraction g(p1) of borrowers with initial likelihood of
success p1 are good borrowers.3 In particular, it is public information that safe projects are
2This assumption enables us to study two-stage optimal contracts. Those contracts are easy to characterize.
Fully characterizing longer-term contracts is beyond the scope of this paper and should not alter our basic
ﬁndings.
3Notice that we do not make any assumption of independence of outcome across projects. We simply
5more likely to be good projects. Like Bolton and Freixas (2000), we restrict parameters so
that in an environment with full information bad projects would not be implemented.
Assumption 2.1. ¯ pR < 1
On the other hand, some good projects are proﬁtable in the sense that for p1 large enough,
expected returns exceed the opportunity cost of the funds a project requires:
Assumption 2.2. ¯ pR + g(¯ p)R>2
Like lenders, the bank is inﬁnitely lived. It can store deposits on behalf of lenders during
the period with a net return normalized to zero.4 It can also lend funds to borrowers. In that
case, the bank incurs a cost ρt ≥ 0 for each unit of good it lends to borrowers at date t,a n d
discovers whether each project is good or bad at the end of the ﬁrst stage of production.
Instead of depositing their endowment at the bank, lenders can make lend it directly to a
borrower. If at date t − 1 a lender chose the bank option, choosing the direct lending option
at date t entails cost ct > 0. Lenders who already chose to lend their endowment directly at
date t − 1 can do so once again at date t at no cost. We will refer to lenders and borrowers
who contract directly with each other as the ﬁnancial market.B ysize of the ﬁnancial market
we will mean the mass of projects so funded. Unlike the bank, lenders on the ﬁnancial market
only ﬁnd out whether a project is good or bad after funding its second stage.
3 Contracts
Consider a borrower who seeks funding from the bank given a current cost ρ ≥ 0o fi n t e r m e -
diation. A contract between the borrower and the bank stipulates a transfer x1 ≤ R from the
borrower to the bank if the project succeeds in the ﬁrst half-period, and a transfer x2 ≤ R
at the end of the period if the borrower turns out to be good. Because they enjoy private
assume no aggregate uncertainty.
4Alternatively, we could assume that the bank has access to a foreign capital market where a one period
risk-free security pays zero interest.
6beneﬁt B when and only when their project is ﬁnanced, bad borrowers want their projects
to be implemented in both half-periods. Since bad projects are never proﬁtable (assumption
2.1), bad borrowers have no choice but to mimic the behavior of good borrowers. Therefore,
all borrowers of a given publicly observable type p1 receive the same terms from the bank.
We will assume that the bank behaves competitively so that among the contracts that cover
the bank’s expected costs, the most favorable to good borrowers prevails. That is, the bank
oﬀers borrowers of type p1 a contract x1,x 2 that solves:
max
x1,x2≤R
p1(R − x1)+R − x2 +2 B
subject to the following participation constraint:
p1x1 + g(p1)x2 ≥ 1+ρ + g(p1)(1 + ρ)
Indeed, good borrowers are successful with probability p1 in the ﬁrst half-period, in which
case their net income is R−x1, and are successful with probability 1 in the second half-period
and earn R−x2. They also enjoy non-monetary beneﬁts 2B since the project is implemented
in both subperiods. The bank’s expected return and cost depend on whether the borrower
is good or bad. They earn x1 during the ﬁrst stage with probability p1,a n dx2 during the
second stage if the borrower proves good, which occurs in fraction g(p1) of the projects. The
bank’s cost per unit loaned is the sum of the monitoring cost ρ and the gross return, 1, on
risk-free investments. The bank’s cost, therefore, is 1 + ρ for the ﬁrst half-period, and 1 + ρ
again for the second half period when the borrower turns out to be good. Note that the bank
can cover its expected cost if and only if p1R + g(p1)R ≥ 1+ρ + g(p1)(1 + ρ). Denote by
pB(ρ)t h ev a l u eo fp1 for which this condition holds as an equality. The optimal contract is
easy to characterize:
Proposition 3.1. Optimal bank contracts for borrowers with projects of type p1 ≥ pB(ρ),a r e
x1 = R and x2 =
1+ρ+g(p1)(1+ρ)−p1R
g(p1) . The bank oﬀers no contract to other borrowers.
7Proof. Write the objective function as (p1+1)R−(p1x1+g(p1)x2)−(1−g(p1))x2+2B.A ta
solution, the bank’s participation constraint is binding since the objective function is strictly





p1x1 + g(p1)x2 =1+ρ + g(p1)(1 + ρ).
Since 1−g(p1) > 0, making x2 as low as possible is optimal. This implies that (R,
1+ρ+g(p1)(1+ρ)−p1R
g(p1) )
is optimal. Indeed, assumption 2.1 says that setting x1 = R does not suﬃce to cover the bank’s
costs. Together with the fact that p1 ≥ pB(ρ), it implies that
1+ρ+g(p1)(1+ρ)−p1R
g(p1) ∈ (0,R]. To
prove the second part of the proposition, simply note that the participation constraint is
violated even if x1 = x2 = R if p1 <p (ρ).
Turning now to the ﬁnancial market, assume that contracts on the ﬁnancial market cur-
rently give gross surplus qM to lenders. We assume that borrowers and lenders behave com-
petitively in the ﬁnancial market in the sense that they take this surplus as given. We will
refer to qM as the price of ﬁnancial market contract. Then the optimal contract for good
borrowers with initial success probability p1 solves:
maxp1(R − x1)+R − x2 +2 B
subject to the lenders’ participation constraint:
p1x1 + g(p1)x2 ≥ q
M
Denote by pM(qM) the unique value of p1 such that p1R+g(p1)R = qM. Optimal contracts on
the ﬁnancial market are derived as in the case of banking contracts, and the same arguments
as in the proof of proposition 3.1 yield:
8Proposition 3.2. Optimal contracts on the ﬁnancial market for borrowers of type p1 ≥
pM(qM) satisfy x1 = R,a n dx2 =
qM−p1R
g(p1) . Other borrowers are not oﬀered a contract on the
ﬁnancial market.
Notice that since competition prevails on both ﬁnancial sectors, the surplus borrowers
enjoy in each type of contract is a monotonic function of the right hand side of the participation
constraint. Borrowers of a given type simply choose the ﬁnancial option associated with the
weakest participation constraint. As a corollary, all the equilibrium results we establish below
continue to hold as long as borrowers have preferences representable by a strictly increasing
utility function. Assuming that they are risk-averse, for instance, would not change any of
our conclusions.
4 Equilibrium
Our goal is to study ﬁnancial market development in an economy with a given sequence
{ct,ρ t,F t}
+∞
t=0 of ﬁnancial market entry costs, intermediation costs and distributions of ob-
servable project characteristics.5 Like Lucas and Prescott (1971), we will study equilibria in
which all agents know and take as given the sequence {qM
t }
+∞
t=0 of prices of ﬁnancial market
contracts. We will require that when agents behave optimally given those prices, the market
for each type of ﬁnancing clears every period.
Recall that at a given date t>0, a lenders’ opportunities to invest his endowment depend
on their investment decision at date t − 1. If at date t − 1 they supplied their endowment
on the ﬁnancial market, they can choose to do the same at no cost at date t. We will denote
by V M
t the expected present value of future income as of date t for lenders who were in the
ﬁnancial market at date t − 1. Other lenders must bear cost ct if they choose to enter the
ﬁnancial market. Let V B
t be the expected present value of future income as of date t for those
lenders. In each period, lenders decide whether to deposit their endowment in the bank, or
5By Ft we mean the distribution of borrowers’observable success types. We assume for notational simplicity
that R and g are constant across projects and across time.
9lend it on the ﬁnancial market. They choose the option that maximizes their future income.














Indeed, lending on the ﬁnancial market yields qM
t in the current period and expected income
V M
t+1 as of date t + 1. Bank deposits on the other hand yield zero net return (since the bank
behaves competitively) and give the lender expected income V B
t+1 as of period t + 1. Similar














Denote by et the mass of lenders who enter the ﬁnancial market at date t while xt is the fraction
of lenders who exit the ﬁnancial market. Because there are more lenders than borrowers
( >1) in each period, it is necessary in equilibrium that qM
t −ct + βV M
t+1 ≤ 2+βV B
t+1 for all
t>0, with equality if et > 0. But this implies V B
t =2+βV B









As for exit, xt > 0 in equilibrium for some t will imply qM
t + βV M
t+1 ≤ 2+βV B
t+1,o rm o r e
succinctly, qM
t +βV M
t+1 ≤ V B. In passing, note as a result of these observations, xt > 0 implies
et = 0. Entry into and exit from the ﬁnancial market cannot coincide in equilibrium.6
We now turn to the problem solved by borrowers in equilibrium. We need to calculate
the mass of borrowers who obtain funding on the ﬁnancial market in each period. Recall
ﬁrst that borrowers whose project is too risky, speciﬁcally borrowers whose p1 is such that
p1 <p M(qM
t )a tag i v e nd a t et ≥ 0, cannot get any funding on the ﬁnancial market. Borrowers
whose p1 exceed this threshold expect utility p1R+R+2B−(1+ρt+g(p1)(1+ρt)) from the
bank, while on the ﬁnancial market they expect p1R+R+2B −qM
t . Therefore, a borrower’s
expected utility is higher on the ﬁnancial market if qM
t ≤ 1+ρt + g(p1)(1 + ρt). It follows
6This feature is no longer present when we introduce exogenous exit in section 6.
10that borrowers on the ﬁnancial market at date t have mass 1 − Ft(p∗
1(qM









q − (1 + ρ)
1+ρ

for all q,ρ ≥ 0, with the convention that g−1 is zero if
q−(1+ρ)
1+ρ is negative. It is, in other words,
borrowers with relatively safe projects that opt for the ﬁnancial market. This is because bank
monitoring is particularly valuable for good borrowers with a low p1. Our model inherits this
feature from the model of Bolton and Freixas (2000). Note for future reference that p∗
1 is
continuous, rises with its ﬁrst argument, and decreases with its second argument.
We can now deﬁne an equilibrium from the vantage point of a reference date t =0 .
All relevant past information is summarized by the mass m−1 of lenders who were on the
ﬁnancial market at date −1, that is, the size of the ﬁnancial market at date −1. Given m−1,
a sequence {mt}
+∞
t=0 of ﬁnancial market sizes, a sequence {qM
t }
+∞
t=0 of ﬁnancial market prices,
the associated value functions {V M
t }
+∞
t=0, and a sequence {et,x t}
+∞
t=0 of entry and exit decisions
constitute an equilibrium if:
1. qM
t − ct + βV M
t+1 ≤ V B with equality if et > 0,
2. qM
t + βV M
t+1 ≤ 2
1−β if xt > 0,
3. for all t ≥ 0, mt+1 = mt − xt + et,
4. for all t ≥ 0, mt =1− Ft(p∗
1(qM
t ,ρ t)).
The key result of this section is that the fundamental characteristics {ct,ρ t,F t}
+∞
t=0 of the
economy uniquely determine its ﬁnancial development.




t=0 of ﬁnancial market sizes exists.
Proof. From a technical standpoint, our economy resembles the framework of Hopenhayn
11(1992),7 and like Hopenhayn, we will adapt the arguments of Lucas and Prescott (1971)




1(Dt(m),ρ t)) = m.
Dt(m) is therefore the market price for which m lenders are active in the market. To see
that Dt is well-deﬁned for all t, recall that Ft is continuous and strictly increasing, and
note that for q large enough p∗
1(q,ρt) = 1, while for q small enough p∗
1(q,ρt)=0 . T h e nl e t
Dt(0) = limm↓0 Dt(m)a n dDt(1) = limm↑1 Dt(m). Because p1 + g(p1) converges to zero as p1
falls, we have Dt(1) = 0. Furthermore, Dt is strictly decreasing on [0,1] for all t, because Ft





for all m ∈ [0,1] and t ≥ 0, and extend S on [1, ]b yS(m,t)=S(1,t)i fm>1. Since
limm↑1 S1(m,t)=Dt(1) = 0, S(•,t) is diﬀerentiable on [0, ]. Now consider for all t the
following surplus maximization problem:
v(m,t)=m a x
e,x S(m + e − x,t) − ect − 2(m + e − x)+βv(m + e − x,t +1 )
subject to : x ≥ 0
x ≤ m
e ≥ 0
e ≤   − m
Our goal is to show that solutions to the surplus maximization problem and competitive
equilibrium allocations coincide. A standard appeal to dynamic programming arguments
7Our environment diﬀers from Hopenhayn’s in one important respect. The demand for funds on the
ﬁnancial market depends not only on the price of the funds, but also on time-varying intermediation and
entry costs, and characteristics of the distribution projects.
12shows that for all t ≥ 0, v(•,t) is well-deﬁned, concave, and diﬀerentiable on [0, ], and that
v1(m,t)=0i fm ≥ 1 (since exit is free.) Let λ, µ, η and γ be the non-negative multipliers
associated with the four constraints, respectively. Necessary and suﬃcient8 conditions for a
solution to the above maximization program at date t are:
−S1(m + e − x,t)+2− βv1(m + e − x,t +1 )+λ − µ =0 ( 4 . 3 )
S1(m + e − x,t) − ct − 2+βv1(m + e − x,t +1 )+η − γ =0 ( 4 . 4 )
λx =0 ( 4 . 5 )
µ(m − x) = 0 (4.6)
ηe =0 ( 4 . 7 )
γ(  − m − e) = 0 (4.8)
Observe that e>0 implies x = 0. Indeed, if η = 0 then (4.3) and (4.4) imply that λ =
ct + µ + γ>0. Conversely, x>0 implies e =0 .A l s on o t et h a tγ = 0. To see this, suppose
γ>0s ot h a te =   − m>0 by (4.8). Then x =0( s i n c ee>0) and µ = 0 by (4.6). Then,
since S1(m,t)=0a n dv1(m,t)=0w h e nm ≥ 1, (4.3) implies that λ<0, a contradiction.
Now let {xt,e t}
+∞
t=0 be a solution to the surplus maximization problem. Then together with








t = S1(mt + et − xt,t),
for all t,( 4 .3−4.8) imply that {xt,e t,m t}
+∞
t=0 satisfy the four deﬁning conditions of a compet-
itive equilibrium. We need only check that {V M
t }
+∞
t=0 so deﬁned satisﬁes equation (4.1). The
8These conditions are suﬃcient because S(•,t) is strictly concave for all t on [0,1] since Dt is strictly
decreasing.
13envelope theorem gives
v1(mt,t)=S1(mt + et − xt,t) − 2+βv1(mt + et − xt,t+1 )+µt
for all t,w h e r eµt ≥ 0 is the value of the multiplier associated with the second constraint at
date t. But then (4.3) implies v1(mt,t)=λt.S ov1(mt,t) ≥ 0. If λt happens to be positive,
xt = 0 by (4.5), hence µt = 0 by (4.6). Then λt = S1(m+e−x,t)−2+βv1(m+e−x,t+1),
by (4.3), or , λt = qM
t − 2+β(V M














which is equation (4.1) with V B
t = V B =2 /(1−β) for all t. So we have shown that solutions
to the surplus maximization problem are competitive equilibria. That competitive equilibria
are solutions to the surplus problem is established similarly.
To see that an equilibrium exists, observe that the surplus maximization problem is the
maximization of a continuous function on a compact subset of I R∞ equipped with the product
topology. As for uniqueness, note that the set of feasible sequences {xt,e t}
+∞
t=0 is convex, and
that S(•,t) is strictly concave for all t because Dt is strictly decreasing. This completes the
proof.
Proposition 4.1 is not merely of technical interest. It implies that our theory for why
ﬁnancial structures vary in observably similar economies is not one of multiple equilibria.
Given an initial size of the ﬁnancial sector, economies with the same sequence of fundamental
characteristics have the same equilibrium sequence of ﬁnancial structures. Fundamentals fully
explain ﬁnancial structures. Put another way, if two economies reach two diﬀerent ﬁnancial
systems, their fundamental characteristics must have diﬀered at some point. This, however,
does not imply that two economies whose fundamental characteristics converge will converge
to similar ﬁnancial systems. We now turn to establishing this result.
145 Fundamental vs. ﬁnancial convergence
In this section we compare the equilibrium sequence of ﬁnancial structures of economies with
diﬀerent sequences of fundamental characteristics. Formally, let i ∈{ 1,2} index two distinct
economies. Denote by (ci
t,ρ i
t,Fi
t) the ﬁnancial market entry cost, the bank intermediation cost,
and the distribution of observable project characteristics in economy i at date t. By economy
i’s fundamental characteristics at date t we mean (ci
t,ρ i
t,Fi






fundamentals together with an initial size mi
−1 of the ﬁnancial market in economy i imply a
unique equilibrium sequence {mi
t}
+∞
t=0 of ﬁnancial structures, by proposition 4.1. The question
we ask in this section is whether convergence (in some sense) of (ρ1
t,c 1
t,F1
t )t o( ρ2
t,c 2
t,F2
t )w i t h
t implies that m1
t converges to m2
t, for any pair (m1
−1,m 2
−1) of initial conditions.
We will show that convergence in fundamentals does not imply convergence in ﬁnancial
structures unless entry into the ﬁnancial market is free. To emphasize the key role of entry
costs, we ﬁrst show that if, eventually, c1
t = c2
t = 0, then convergence in fundamentals imply
ﬁnancial convergence. In this case, ﬁnancial market entry is eventually costless and lenders
solve a static problem as past ﬁnancial decisions do not matter. The supply of funds on the
ﬁnancial market, therefore, only depends on current fundamental characteristics. If those
characteristics converge, so must the size of the ﬁnancial sector. For concreteness, we will




t converge to zero
with t in the usual sense, while F 1
t − F 2
t converges to zero uniformly on [0,1]. To avoid the




t=0 is a normal family of
functions:9
Assumption 5.1. {F 1
t − F 2
t }
+∞
t=0 is equicontinuous on [0,1].
Under that assumption, we obtain:
Proposition 5.2. If c1
t = c2
t =0for t large enough, convergence in fundamentals implies
convergence in ﬁnancial structures.




t=0 has a small Julia set suﬃces. Potential
problems only arise in the proof of proposition 5.2i fp∗







t =0f r o mt on, V M
s = V B for all s ≥ t in both economies and the
supply of funds on the ﬁnancial market in a given period is independent of the previous
size of the ﬁnancial sector. Speciﬁcally, when qs =2a td a t es ≥ t, lenders are indiﬀerent
between the bank and the ﬁnancial market. The supply of fund, in that case, is any number
in [0, ]. Demand, on the other side is 1 − F i
s(p∗
1(2,ρ i
s)) in economy i, which is contained is
[0,1]. Therefore qs = 2 clears markets for all s ≥ t. Since the equilibrium sequence of market
sizes is unique, we must have mi
s =1− F i
s(p∗
1(2,ρ i
s)) for i =1 , 2a n ds ≥ t. To complete the





Indeed, whenever ρ>1, p∗
1(2,ρ)=p∗
1(2,1). Therefore, p∗
1 is uniformly continuous. Because
{F 1
t − F 2
t }
+∞
t=0 is equicontinuous, m1
t − m2
t converges to zero in the standard sense as t rises,
as claimed.
But, in general, fundamental convergence does not imply ﬁnancial convergence. To see
this, we consider an extreme case of fundamental convergence by assuming that, for both
i ∈{ 1,2},( ci
t,ρ i
t,Fi
t)=( c,ρ,F) for all t. We further restrict parameters so that if c =0t h e
ﬁnancial sector is active in every period. Without such an assumption, the two economies
would jump to the same degenerate (banks only) ﬁnancial structure immediately. Formally,
Assumption 5.3. 1 − F(p∗
1(2,ρ)) > 0.
When, as is now the case, fundamentals are constant, it is natural to inquire about invari-
ant values for the size of the ﬁnancial sector, that is, set of initial conditions m∗ such that
if m−1 = m∗, mt = m∗ for all t in equilibrium. Let Γ be the set of such initial values. A
necessary condition for economies with the same sequence of constant fundamentals to always
converge to the same ﬁnancial structure is that Γ be a singleton. Otherwise, two economies
whose initial conditions are two distinct points of the invariant set would remain at those
distinct points at all dates. The following remark records the fact that Γ is a singleton when
entry into the ﬁnancial market is costless.
16Remark 5.4. If c =0 , Γ is a singleton.
Proof. When c =0 ,mt =1− F(p∗
1(2,ρ)) for all t in equilibrium, regardless of m−1.
In fact, when c = 0 and all fundamentals are identical in the two economies, both
economies jump to the unique invariant size of the ﬁnancial sector immediately and remain
there. They trivially converge to the same ﬁnancial structure. When c>0 however, there are
many invariant distributions and, therefore, convergence in fundamentals in any sense does
not imply convergence in ﬁnancial structures.
Proposition 5.5. If c>0, Γ is a closed interval of strictly positive diameter.
Proof. Let m∗ =1−F(p∗
1(2,ρ)) and assume that c>0. If qt =2f o ra l lt then et =0f o ra l lt.
(Indeed, lenders are just willing to enter markets if qt =2f o ra l lt when c = 0.) In particular,
m∗ remains invariant when c>0. Now choose q  so that if qt = q  for all t, V M
t − c = V B for
all t.T h e nq  > 2 (because c>0) and for all q ∈ (2,q ), qt = q for all t implies V M
t −c<VB
for all t so that et =0f o ra l lt. But since q>2w ea l s oh a v ext =0f o ra l lt. It follows that for
q ∈ [2,q ], m =1− F(p∗
1(q,ρ)) is invariant. Because F is strictly increasing and continuous,
the set of invariant sizes of the ﬁnancial market is a closed interval of positive mass.
The intuition for this result is simple. Fundamentals imply a unique sequence of prices of
ﬁnancial contracts. Those prices can be such that it is proﬁtable for lenders who have borne
the entry cost to remain on the ﬁnancial market, but not high enough to cover the entry cost
for lenders who have yet to bear it. If c is high, many such price sequences exist and so,
therefore, do many invariant sizes of the ﬁnancial market. The fact that the upper bound of
the set of invariant distribution is the unique element (m∗ =1−F(p∗
1(2,ρ)) of Γ in economies
where entry costs are zero should also be intuitive. It is ﬁnally easy to see that for c large
enough or ρ low enough, Γ = [0,m ∗] so that, in that case, economies that did not develop a
ﬁnancial market in the past never will.
176 Discussion of our key assumptions
Many of the simplifying assumptions we have made heretofore are easy to relax. For instance,
assuming that borrowers also face a cost when they choose to participate in ﬁnancial markets
(say, for the sake of symmetry with lenders), or assuming that exit from ﬁnancial markets
is costly, would add notation without altering any of our results. Similarly assuming more
general monotonic preferences for borrowers would not aﬀect our results. Two critical as-
sumptions we make however are that 1) no exogenous exit from ﬁnancial markets ever occurs
and, 2) that lenders cannot fund more than one project with bounded size. The purpose of
this section is to discuss the role of those two key assumptions.
6.1 Exogenous exit
So far we have assumed that there is no exit from the ﬁnancial market for exogenous reasons.
Lenders exit when and only when it is proﬁt maximizing for them to do so. Lenders who
entered the ﬁnancial market in the past because fundamental characteristics justiﬁed it may
choose to stay put in equilibrium while given current and future fundamentals lenders who
have yet to pay the ﬁxed cost maximize their income by staying out of the ﬁnancial market.
To highlight the importance of this feature of our model, we now introduce exogenous exit
by assuming that a fraction δ>0 of lenders die every period and are immediately replaced
by newly born lenders. Furthermore, all newly born lenders have to pay the ﬁxed cost if they
choose to enter the ﬁnancial market. For clarity, we state here the equations which the value
functions of lenders must solve when death occurs with positive likelihood. From the point
































Our deﬁnition of an equilibrium changes little. The main diﬀerence is that condition 3 be-
comes, for all t ≥ 0, mt+1 = mt(1 − δ) − xt + et,w h e r ext is the mass of surviving lenders
who choose to exit the ﬁnancial market in period t. One can replicate the arguments behind
proposition 4.1 to show that equilibria continue to exist and that the equilibrium path of
ﬁnancial market sizes continues to be unique. More importantly, we can also show:
Proposition 6.1. If δ>0,t h e nΓ is a singleton. Furthermore, if for i ∈{ 1,2} and for all
t ≥ 0( ct
t,ρ i
t,Fi
t)=( c,ρ,F),t h e nm1
t − m2
t is zero after a ﬁnite number of periods.
Proof. Let m∗ be an element of Γ. (Γ is not empty because it always contains at least the
unique invariant distribution that prevails when c =0 . )I fm∗ > 0, then there must be some
entry in invariant equilibrium in all periods since xt + δm∗ > 0 for all t. This implies that
qt =¯ q for all t where
¯ q
1−βδ − c = V B or, ¯ q =2+( 1− βδ)c.T h a ti s ,¯ q is the unique constant
price of ﬁnancial market contracts such that lenders are just willing to enter the ﬁnancial
market in each period. But then m∗ =1−F(p∗
1(¯ q,ρ)) is the only possible element of Γ. Note
that if (and only if) 1 − F(p∗
1(¯ q,ρ)) = 0, m∗ = 0 is the only element of Γ.
To see that both economies converge to Γ’s unique element, assume that m∗ > 0a n d
that m1
t <m ∗ for some t.T h e nqt > ¯ q for otherwise we would have too many borrowers on
the ﬁnancial market in economy 1 since 1 − F(p∗
1(¯ q,ρ)) = m∗ >m 1
t.I fqs > ¯ q for all s>t
then all lenders would enter the ﬁnancial market at date t since ¯ q is such that, if maintained
for ever, lenders are just willing to enter the ﬁnancial market. This is incompatible with
equilibrium. So we must have qs < ¯ q for some s>tso that, at some s, ms ≥ m∗.I fms = m∗,
we are done. So without loss of generality we can assume that mi
−1 >m ∗ for i ∈{ 1,2},
that is start both economies above the invariant size of ﬁnancial market. We will construct a
continuation equilibrium from that point that converges to m∗ in a ﬁnite number of period.
Because equilibria are unique from any initial size, the result will then be established.
19Let ˜ mi
t = mi
−1(1 − δ)t+1 for all t.I f , a t d a t e t,˜ mi
t <m ∗ let qt(mi
−1)=¯ q.O t h e r w i s e ,
let qt(mi
−1) be such that the ﬁnancial market clears at size ˜ mi
t, i.e. the unique solution to
1−F(p∗
1(q,ρ)) = ˜ mi
t.L e tV M
t be the corresponding value function for lenders on the ﬁnancial
market. Note that qt(mi
−1) ≤ ¯ q for all t. Therefore, at those prices, V M
t ≤ V B + c. Deﬁne













In words, ¯ m−1 is the largest initial size of the ﬁnancial market such that the resulting future
prices induce no endogenous exit. If mi
−1 > ¯ m−1 then V M




In that case, set ˜ mi
t =¯ m(1 − δ)t+1 for all t and construct prices as before. To complete our
construction of an equilibrium, we need to describe a path for entry and exit from the ﬁnancial
market. If mi
−1 ≤ ¯ m,s e txt =0f o ra l lt.I fmi
−1 > ¯ m,t h e ns e tx0 =( 1− δ)(mi
−1 − ¯ m)a n d
xt =0f o ra l lt>0. As for entry, set et =0i f ˜ mi
t >m ∗, et = m∗ − (1 − δ)˜ mi
t the ﬁrst time
that (1 − δ)˜ mi
t <m ∗,a n det = δm∗ after that. One easily checks that we have constructed
an equilibrium from initial condition mi
−1.W h a t ’ s m o r e , mi
t = m∗ a f t e ra tm o s t 
log(m∗)
log(1−δ) 
periods in both economies. In particular, m1
t − m2
t = 0 after a ﬁnite number of periods, as
claimed.
Obtaining convergence, therefore, requires that exit occurs exogenously suﬃciently enough,
and that the lenders who replace lenders on the ﬁnancial market do not inherit their opportu-
nities. Note however that convergence occurs at a rate that depends on the rate of exogenous
exit. While not permanent, diﬀerences in ﬁnancial market can be arbitrarily persistent if the
rate of exogenous exit is low.
6.2 Project size
In our model, participation in the ﬁnancial market allows lenders to manage exactly one
project for any number of periods after bearing a cost of entry. However, they cannot fund
more than one project. Relaxing this assumption enables lenders to mitigate entry costs. For
20instance, lenders could pool resources and delegate a representative in the ﬁnancial market,
dividing the proceeds equally among members of the coalition.10 If the entry cost borne by the
coalition does not increase with its size, the entry cost per project can be made arbitrarily
small. As a consequence, the set of invariant ﬁnancial market sizes will shrink. One key
assumption we are making, therefore, is that the total cost of setting up projects rises with
the number of projects, even if the same lender is involved in all projects.
A related assumption we are making is that project size is unique. Under the alternative
assumption that lenders can fund project of various sizes, and that set-up costs increase less
than linearly with size, large projects would be funded ﬁrst on the ﬁnancial market. But,
again, as long as funding more projects carries an initial cost, channelling more resources to
the ﬁnancial market will be more costly. Then, as in our basic model, economies who have
created a large ﬁnancial market in the past will remain more likely to have a large ﬁnancial
market in the future, making ﬁnancial structure persistent. In short, as long as making the
ﬁnancial market bigger from one period to the next is costly, history will continue to matter.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented a dynamic, general equilibrium model in which ﬁnancial structure dif-
ferences between two economies can persist even after fundamental characteristics have con-
verged. In simple terms, this occurs in our theory because channelling funds through the
ﬁnancial market is cheaper in economies that have borne the cost of building large ﬁnancial
markets in the past.
A possible illustration of these forces at play are the economic histories of Germany and
the United States. Germany used to impose signiﬁcant legal barriers to entry into ﬁnancial
markets. Meanwhile, federal laws discouraged bank intermediation in the U.S. As a conse-
quence, early on, banks became heavily involved in corporate lending in Germany, while U.S.
10Lenders could also choose to accumulate resources in order to fund several projects. Wealth accumulation
introduces additional technical complications since the evolution of the economy now depends on another state
variable. But as long as setting up more projects is costly for lenders, ﬁnancial systems should be persistent.
21ﬁrms learned to rely on other sources of funds. Even though the legal frameworks of the two
nations no longer diﬀer much, the U.S. has a longer history of ﬁnancial market lending than
Germany, and ﬁnancial markets remain a more cost-eﬀective source of funds for U.S. ﬁrms
than for German ﬁrms.
Quite importantly, equilibria are unique and Pareto optimal in our model. Financial
structures are eﬃcient given the fundamental characteristics of each economy. While current
fundamentals may not suﬃce to explain a nation’s current ﬁnancial structure, together with
past fundamentals they fully explain, and justify it. More generally, our model suggests that
basic industrial organization principles could help us understand why ﬁnancial structures vary
so markedly across nations.
A Historical Motivation
One motivation for this paper is the fact that, historically, institutional environments have
diﬀered markedly in Germany and the United States. In the U.S., banking activities have
been regulated by states since the end of the Second Bank of the U.S. in 1836. The fear of
concentration in the banking sector prompted most states to impose restrictions on branching.
The National Banking System introduced after the Civil War in 1863 further limited the scale
and scope of banks by restricting their holdings of equities and imposing minimum capital
requirement (see Sylla, 1969). The importance of local banks, the absence of nationwide banks
and the absence of a central bank created an environment propitious to banking panics.11 In
response, the Federal Reserve System was created in 1913. The poor functioning of the
banking sector until then favored the development of alternative sources of ﬁnance, and
the growing role of ﬁnancial markets. Davis (1965) writes that “a series of new ﬁnancial
institutions capable of surmounting the barriers raised by distance and by the lack of adequate
branch-banking legislation was innovated. In the period 1870 to 1914, barriers to short-term
mobility were overcome by direct solicitation of interregional funds, by commercial bank
rediscounting, and most important, by the evolution of a national market for commercial
paper.” Unlike the banking sector, ﬁnancial markets were subject to little regulation in the
U.S. (see Smith and Werner, 1991). Incumbent ﬁnancial market participants managed to
erect some barriers to entry,12 but the presence of many competing institutions and large
broking ﬁrms mitigated the impact of these barriers. Michie (1986) points out for instance
11Panics occurred in 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1893 and 1907.
12Davis and Neal (1998) and Michie (1986) review the history of the New York Stock Exchange. The
exchange started operating in 1792 with 24 members and was formally established in 1817. The number of
22that “the most serious challenge [to the New York Stock Exchange] came in 1885, when
a number of rival exchanges merged to form the Consolidated Stock Exchange, with 2403
members”, which competed with the New York Stock Exchange until World War I.
While the relative importance of banks declined in the U.S. in the XIXth century, they
became the dominant source of funds for ﬁrms in Germany. According to Guinnane (2002),
several institutional factors explain the historical dominance of bank ﬁnancing in Germany.
Prior to 1871, Germany was a constellation of independent states with local control over
ﬁnancial regulations. Most states restricted the number of limited liability ﬁrms, as they
feared the separation of ﬁrm’s ownership and ﬁrm’s liabilities would allow entrepreneurs to
escape their debts and because they wanted to extract rents from granting this privilege. The
right to set up a joint stock ﬁrm was seldom granted. In 1857, only 203 joint stock ﬁrms
existed in Germany. Despite high demand and an improved legal framework under the 1861
Business Code, very few additional ﬁrms had obtained joint stock status by 1870. Banks thus
remained the main providers of funds for most industrial ﬁrms’ funds in Germany. Guinnane
(2002) and Tilly (1998) also argue that the presence of a lender of last resort made banks
more willing to engage in industrial lending. The Bank of Prussia, founded in 1847, “acted,
to some degree at least, like a lender of last resort. Banks that were in trouble could sell bills
out of their own portfolio to the Bank of Prussia” (Tilly, 1998). The Bank of Prussia later
became the Reichsbank, and continued to serve this role. In contrast, no lender of last resort
existed in the United States until the Federal Reserve was founded in 1913.
Despite the many institutional barriers they faced, ﬁnancial markets experienced a short-
lived growth spurt after Prussia defeated Austria in the 1866 war and the new North German
Confederation was founded. All trade barriers were abolished and a single currency was estab-
lished. An economic boom ensued marked by large capital-intensive projects such as railroad
expansion. The Berlin Stock Exchange expanded briskly for a few years, but was severely
hit by the 1873 crash. As a response to the ensuing instability, Germany decided to restrict
the Berlin Stock Exchange’s activities in a process that culminated with the 1884 and 1896
company Laws. Although some debate the eﬀects of the companies laws on ﬁrms’ ﬁnance (see
Fohlin 2001), these laws imposed new constraints on ﬁnancial markets activities. For instance
Tilly (1982) reports that “only larger ﬁrms having a stock exchange listing could tap in that
market for capital without delay and only large ﬁrms would not ﬁnd the minimum issue vol-
ume of one million marks and minimum share size of one thousand marks inconvenient. This
gap must have beneﬁted banks who did have access to the stock exchange, but it also must
have excluded many potential users of the capital market.” As far as investors are concerned,
the 1885 stock exchange laws restricted access to the Berlin Stock Exchange. Entrance tick-
members reached 1,100 in 1879 and remained there until 1914. Then, a new member had to buy the seat of
an existing member and pay a substantial entry fee ranging between $64,000 and $94,000 in 1910. The fact
that existing members owned the stock exchange enabled them to levy a minimum commission for each trade
and restrict the type of securities they wished to trade. As a result, the average size of each issue from quoted
industrial and commercial companies was $24.7 million by 1914. Minimum commissions and restricted access
created ineﬃciencies and fragmented the New York securities market.
23ets (“Eintrittskarte”) were only granted to members of the “Korporation der Kaufmannschaft
von Berlin” and owners of ﬁrms or corporations that were registered in Berlin.13 Importantly,
it is barriers to access to the stock market, rather than its malfunctioning, that seem to have
limited its development. Fohlin and Gehrig (2004) argue that the Berlin Stock Exchange was
surprisingly eﬃcient for the time.
Although legal diﬀerences between Germany, the U.S. and other nations (see e.g Allen and
Gale, 2000) still exist, they are fading. In the U.S. for instance, the Riegel-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Eﬃciency Act of 1994 set up a timetable for relaxing the restrictions
on interstate banking. Also, the restrictions imposed by The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 on
securities underwriting have been gradually relaxed.14
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